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This author thinks philosophers can learn from 
philosophy for children which attempts to 
recapture the spirit of the Socratic dialogue. 
Why philosophy 
for children? 
by Darrell R. Shepard 
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" Philosophy for children" catches the imagination as 
much as "Torn Swift: Boy President." But while there may 
be few arguments ·for the latt er, there are some very 
powerful arguments for the former. 
But first let us be very c lear what we mean by 
philosphy for children . We may mean dealing with 
philosophical questions; or we may mean dealing with 
questions philosophically-In a d ialogical, critical and 
cumulative search for answers and awareness of alter· 
natives. We would seld om mean dealing with the pronounce-
ments of philosophers as such. While the child could un· 
doubtedly be trained to spew back such pronounce· 
ments, I am at a loss why we should want him to do so. 
We should also be very clear that philosophy already 
permeates our child's curriculum-sometimes by its 
presence, sometimes by its absence. Social studies, now 
understood simply as the study of man, must deal with the 
question "What is man?" by answering It or by ignoring it. 
More obviously, moral education has always had a place in 
the curriculum. The valueless classroom has never 
existed. The issue is not whether philosophy shall have a 
place in the curriculum, but whether the hidden 
curriculum will become the open curriculum, whether we 
can do it better by doing it consciously. 
Let us then consider some reasons for doing it con-
sciously. 
Surely it is obvious that II Johnny can't reason, 
Johnny can't read. Reading without understanding defies 
analogy. But, understanding requires grasping fun· 
damental logical relationships and the development of 
Imaginatio n . It is a source of continual amazement that 
educators who have been so suspicious in recent years of 
the transference value of foreign languages for Engli~h 
and of psychology for social development still trust to 
transference when it comes to reasoning . "If we teach the 
child to reason mathematically, scientifically, creatively, 
etc., then the child doesn' t need to think about thinking." 
It Is Interesting to note that in a recent field test of a 
phi losophy for children curricu lum, sharp increases in 
reading scores occurred. 
It is also an obvious pedagogical point that one 
begins any instruction where the s tudent is and with the 
questions the student Is asking. Many of the questions 
asked by children are philosophical questions dealing 
with issues such as justice, death, where the world came 
from, etc. To ignore these questions. hoping they will go 
away, diminishes either the child's respect for himself, or 
for the school, or both. To treat these questions haphaz-
ardly is sophistry and violates the integrity of both the child 
and the teaching profession. It Is dubious whether the 
child need recognize his questions as "philosophical," 
but because such questions require special handling. i t is 
essential that they be recognized as " phi losophical" by 
parents and by teachers. 
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Today we bemoan the sense of anomie and 
meaningl essness which is seen in students and teachers 
alike. While lhe observations of sociologists regarding the 
frag mented nature of society may contribute lo lhe 
patho logy seen in lhe schools, it is hardly the whole story. 
The curriculum Itself may be partly to blame. Ch ildren, as 
their art reveals, have a very comprehensive point of view. 
They seek connections-meanings. Contrast this propen· 
sity o l the child wit h t e curriculum which is divided into 
unconnec ted segments. When Dewey spoke of 
ph il osophy as the method of education, he may·have had 
in mind logic which g ives structure to the various 
discipl ines, or he may have had in mind the integrating 
nature of philosophy which Charles Sidgwick felt was so 
important. Or, Dewey may have been reflect ing upon the 
fact that each of the discip lines rests upon phi losophical 
presuppositions which, among other things, establi sh the 
point of the d iscipline. 
If our worry with meani nglessness is in the larger sense, 
that of the meaning o f li fe, the curric ulum is still of lit-
t le help to the chi ld. Meaning in this sense still requires 
connections which the chi ld has l ittle practice in making. 
Moreover, If the connections are made for the child, we 
are indoctrinating rather that educating. As Matthew Lip-
man has noted, these meanings must be discovered by 
the child for himself. But where is he to look? What op-
portunities does the curriculum afford the child for such 
d iscovery? It Is also interesting that schools which have 
established philos ophical reasoning programs have seen 
a heightening of enthusiasm and a decrease in dropouts. 
Even before Watergate, parents, educators and em· 
ployers were concerned with the value crisis. Into the gap 
stepped moral education, now mandated in several states. 
Students have had their values clarified or thei r develop· 
ment from theoretical s tage encouraged. But as eth ics, 
normally thought of as a part of philosophy, has been 
presented as a separate part of the curriculum in a 
package empty of philosophical content, the problem has 
intensified and psychological harm has often occurred. 
Students are now pronounced as being at Stage 4 or Stage 
5 who still cannot distinguish between an " ought" and 
an " is." indeed, it is extr emely dubious pedagogy to o ffer 
such courses as separate ingredients in the curriculum, 
thereby indirectly suggesting that ethical dile mmas co e 
into our l ives with signs hung around their necks read ing 
" Alert! I am an ethical d ilemma." Effective moral 
education can only take p lace when the moral dimensions 
of problems are probed on the home terri tory of the 
problem in question. 
Because moral education has become a part of the 
curriculum even in states where it is not mandated, the 
issue of indoctrination has arisen as it has not since 
separation o f church and state was guaranteed by the 
Constitution. WhOse values will be taught, teacher's .• 
parent's, society's or Kant's? Many have seen philosophy 
for children as the best protection against indoctrination 
whether i t be In the area of value theory, political theory or 
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mathematical theory. This is because phi losophy Is o ften 
characterized as a search for and an awareness of all er· 
natives. Furthermore, the recognition that X is a logical 
alt ernative will not allow us easily to d isregard or to 
demean the person who believes X. In other words, the 
search for alternatives may simultaneously promote 
respect for persons. 
Perhaps we ·ph ilosophers have much to learn from 
phi losophy for children which often attempts to recapture 
the sp irit of the Socratic dialogue and to inculcate the 
virtue of thinking for oneself. The dialogue, as amply 
illustrated in the Meno, builds-is cumulative-with logic 
as its struc ture. How d ifferent from the bull-sessions in 
· which we and our students part ic ipate- " Now let me tell 
you what happened to me!" As the dialogue builds, the 
questioner becomes the one who is questioned, and ail 
parties assume responsibility for the conclusions which 
they draw. 
Again, the questions dealt with In the Socratic 
dialogues were as o ften acidresse d to Socrates as by 
Socrates. They were questions in the minds of his 
questioners. Thi s, perhaps, also speaks of the 
pedagogical relevance of philosophy for children for 
philosophy begins with thoughts which all children have. 
Not every child has had the experience of grandfather's 
farm to share with his classmates, bu t every child does 
have his own idea of what is fair and his own idea of his 
own thoughts. The real ization o f this ever so fundamental 
level of commonality has prompted claims to be made for 
philosophy for children as a builder o f camaraderie and 
respect within the school as well as the promoter of the 
ideal learning environment where all participate as equals. 
But suppose we step back from all these arguments 
for a moment and attempt an his torical survey of the 
curriculum. Is it not the case that our curriculum has 
become more and more specific, particularized? Compare 
a reader of today with a McGuffey Reader. Today college 
entrance examinations testify to the inability of the young 
adult to generalize property or to handle abstractions. Our 
conclusion must be that they have been trained, but not 
educated-able to handle situations in which they have 
found themse lve s before, but unable to handle situations 
st ightly or greatly divergent although related by princi pies . 
Our answer to th is inability has been anything but 
pedagogically sound .• but it has been self-fulfilling. We 
have further particularized and· specialized instruction, 
catering instead of challenging. Sure enough, our efforts 
have been vindicated. Abstractions and generalizations 
are hard and all of our efforts at specialization and par-
t icularization have not succeeded in devetoping·the abil it y 
to abstract or to generalize property. 
To the· extent that philosophy is that discipline which 
fosters this abil ity to generalize, to assume responsibility 
for one's decisions, to connect ideas which otherwise 
remain unconnected, to respect the ideas o f others and to 
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